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SYMPOSIUM ON SOFT AND HARD LAW ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
TRANSCENDING THE BINARY: LINKING HARD AND SOFT LAW THROUGH A
UNGPS-BASED FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
Claire Methven O’Brien*
Achieving respect for human rights by businesses requires not making the “right” choice between hard and soft
law but establishing an architecture to sustain a constructive dialectic between the two. This essay argues that a
business and human rights treaty modelled as a framework convention and centered initially on the UN Guiding
Principles (UNGPs) offers such a structure while avoiding the shortcomings of treaty proposals advanced to date.
False Dichotomies
Positions taken around the business and human rights treaty initiative1 are often characterized as cleaving along
the lines of conventional binaries. To caricature this Manichean view, but just a little, the treaty pits emerging
against industrialized economies, and is buoyed by activists, while businesses are irreconcilably opposed.
Anything less than unreserved enthusiasm for recent drafts, or the Open-Ended Inter-Governmental Working
Group (OEIGWG) process, moreover, is often read as implying a hard-baked preference for “voluntarism,” cor-
porate social responsibility and soft law, supposedly embodied by the UNGPs,2 over a treaty or indeed business
and human rights laws as such.
Yet such stark dichotomies are not borne out in reality today, if they once were.3 Support for the UNGPs does
not correspond automatically to a rejection of business and human rights legislation. Amongst the UNGPs’ keen-
est advocates are European states that have already adopted due diligence laws. In 2019, the Netherlands passed a
Child Labor Due Diligence Act that requires companies to investigate and develop action plans relating to child
labor, and that carries at least a prospect of criminal convictions.4 France’s Loi de Vigilance permits parties harmed
by failures of due diligence to initiate civil claims for damage.5 Proposals for similar schemes have been tabled in
* Chief Adviser, Danish Institute for Human Rights; Lecturer, Law Department, University of Dundee.
1 Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, Elaboration of an International Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (June 25, 2014).
2 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011).
3 KHALIL HAMDANI & LORRAINE RUFFING, UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: CORPORATE CONDUCT AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST (2017).
4 Wet van 24 oktober 2019 houdende de invoering van een zorgplicht ter voorkoming van de levering van goederen en diensten die met behulp van kinderarbeid
tot stand zijn gekomen (Wet zorgplicht kinderarbeid), Stb. 2019, 401.
5 Loi n° 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre.
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Switzerland, Finland, and Germany, while the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015, EU non-financial reporting, and
conflict minerals laws6 countenance a range of administrative and potentially also criminal sanctions for failures
to comply with disclosure obligations. “Even” the United States has established binding human rights obligations
for companies when acting as suppliers to government,7 as well as penalties for the use of forced and child labor in
supply chains imposed via customs and border controls.8
Neither does a notional North-South divide serve as a reliable guide to attitudes on “hard v. soft” regulation. At
the OEIGWG’s Fifth Session, for instance, Colombia reiterated its support for the UNGPs, and suggested there
was still a need to demonstrate the “value added” of a treaty. China, reflecting its dual identity as both capital
importer and exporter, identified the need to balance human rights and development but also sought restraint
in addressing home states’ extraterritorial obligations.9 While it is true that a groundswell of grassroots organiza-
tions continue strongly to back the Geneva process, prominent human rights advocacy organizations have at times
appeared equivocal.10 If it remains hard to imagine businesses rallying in support of a treaty,11 business advocacy
of due diligence legislation at the national level and on a sector basis has surprised many.12
Diagnosing the Deficiencies of the Current Approach
Yet the OEIGWG process does appear stuck.13 If this cannot be explained away via old tropes, then what is the
problem? States’ interventions at the OEIGWG’s Fifth Session disclose a range of real and substantial flaws in
treaty proposals advanced to date.
First, these proposals fail to recognize and apply foundational international legal principles such as legality and
predictability, as well as established rules relating to such matters as jurisdiction14 and international legal
responsibility.15
Second, they have ventured a level of detail about how states must implement the envisaged obligations that is
almost unknown in the arena of international human rights treaties. The obligation to secure effective remedies for
business-related human rights abuses, for instance, is translated, in the Revised Draft Legally-Binding Instrument
6 Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 Laying Down Supply Chain Due Diligence
Obligations for Union Importers of Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten, their Ores, and Gold Originating from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk
Areas 2017 O.J. (L 130) 1; Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 Amending Directive
2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by Certain Large Undertakings and Groups Text with
EEA Relevance, 2014 O.J. (L.330) 1.
7 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. § 101, at 52.222-50(c), (d), (e), (f), (g) (Combating Trafficking in Persons).
8 Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1307.
9 Statements of Colombia and China, Fifth Session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights.
10 Amnesty International, Human RightsWatch, and the International Commission of Jurists are not members of the Treaty Alliance, for
example.
11 Int’l Org. of Employers et al., Joint Business Response to the Revised Draft Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International
Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (“Revised Draft LBI”) (Oct. 2019).
12 See, e.g., Chocolate Companies and MEPs Call For EU Due Diligence Regulation, FERN (Apr. 10, 2019); Companies Pushing for Finland to Adopt
Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence Legislation, YKKÖSKETJUUN.FI (Sept. 24, 2018).
13 Claire Methven O’Brien, Confronting the Constraints of the Medium: The Fifth Session of the UN Intergovernmental Working Group on a Business
and Human Rights Treaty, 5 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 150 (2020).
14 Claire Methven O’Brien, The Home State Duty to Regulate the Human Rights Impacts of TNCs Abroad: A Rebuttal, 3 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 47
(2018).
15 Opening Statement of Mexico, IGWG Fifth session.
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(Revised LBI), into specific requirements to abolish statutes of limitations, establish criminal corporate liability,
and reverse the burden of proof. In this respect, it is hard to disagree with the U.S. comment that the proposed
instrument pursues “an unworkable ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach,”16 a blunt formulation of a point dressed up in
more diplomatic language by other delegations. On another interpretation, many provisions of texts tabled to date
are shaped by a kind of forum error: clauses that might sit well in the private law world of The Hague are out of
place in Geneva.
Third, in some areas, proposed texts have counselled radical international legal reengineering. Yet here, by con-
trast, detail is lacking. To illustrate, various clauses of the Revised Draft LBI conflate environmental rights and
international humanitarian lawwith human rights,17 and the RevisedDraft LBI establishes civil “harm” as a trigger
for international legal responsibility of both businesses and states. Yet the text omits qualification or elucidation in
either case.
Fourth, because it aims to nail down precise yet universally applicable legal definitions, the Revised Draft LBI is
forced to regress from the ambit of protection expressed by the UNGPs. Thus, for instance, due diligence duties
extend only to contractual relationships, narrowing the scope of the corporate “responsibility to respect” by
excluding other business relationships, along with public procurement, and state-owned enterprises.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, it is scarcely surprising that many states, after five years during which a suc-
cession of texts have been championed then chopped and changed almost beyond recognition, remain unclear as
to the project’s overall purpose and unconvinced of its legal and diplomatic viability.18
Even if a treaty along current lines gained the support necessary to open for signature, it would remain in peril of
redundancy. First, such an instrument might never enter into force but still occupy the available space, perhaps in
perpetuity, for international business and human rights rules. An unratified business and human rights treaty
would, moreover, give succor to the UN human rights system’s increasingly emboldened detractors, while betray-
ing the victims whose suffering is mobilized in its cause.
This would also be true of a treaty that entered into force but failed to secure the commitment of major world
economies. Assuming that states sustained the mandate of the UN Working Group on Business and Human
Rights, soft law-making centered on the UNGPs would continue to unfold, divorced from treaty-related devel-
opments. Civil society’s scarce advocacy resources would, in this scenario, be unprofitably split across two forums.
At best, the normative output of a supervisory body established under such a treaty would be irrelevant; at worst it
would provide a source of continuing dissonance for duty-bearers and rights-holders alike. Given recent drafts’
commitment to detailed prescriptive rules, a range of further difficulties seem plausible: mass reservations; the
inundation of any complaints procedure with technical questions ill-suited to the mechanism; and correspondingly
low rates of remediation by states parties.
Perhaps one way to address such problems would be to narrow the scope of the subject-matter: deep-reaching
rules can work, after all, in tightly delimited areas. Thus, states could restrict the treaty’s focus to rights under only
one or a few selected human rights instruments or to certain categories of rights-holders; to certain business sec-
tors or classes of companies; or, as earlier recommended by John Ruggie, to “gross” human rights violations.19 Yet
the double standards countenanced by such proposals seem at variance with the universality and principles of
16 The United States Government’s ContinuedOpposition to the Business andHuman Rights Treaty Process (Note Verbale), No. 053-19,
Oct. 16, 2019.
17 See, e.g., UN OEIGWG Chairmanship, Revised Draft, Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, In International Human Rights Law,
the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises arts.1(2), 8(1) (July 16, 2019).
18 See, e.g., Opening Statements of India and Mexico.
19 John G. Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 AJIL 819 (2007).
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interdependence, indivisibility, and effectiveness of human rights, as reflected in their failure to gain traction with
stakeholders.
Taking Framework Agreements Seriously—Again
So how will the story end? Dysfunction is not inevitable. Still, without a change of direction, the treaty process
will soon falter. Preferring model-mongering20 to preaching Realpolitik,21 I suggest that adopting a framework
agreement approach could resolve the OEIGWG’s current impasse while bridging the hard law-soft law divide
and contributing meaningfully to advancing respect for human rights in the global market sphere.
Framework agreements define an overall purpose or common objective, in combination with high-level prin-
ciples of a general or procedural nature and devices to promote implementation, such as cooperation and report-
ing.22 In the late 1990s, Braithwaite and Drahos investigated international business regulation across thirteen
industrial sectors and how less powerful constituencies could intervene in it to achieve environmental and social
progress. One of their main conclusions was the need to “Take Framework Agreements Seriously.”23 “[B]rick by
brick over the decades,” they found, “vague and platitudinous” agreements delivered “remarkable specificity,” in
some cases evolving into punitive criminal regimes.
Explaining this phenomenon, Braithwaite andDrahos observed that “[a]greements would rarely bemade if they
started as enforceable bodies of rules.” Narrow norms are hostage to veto coalitions. The implicit uncertainty of
principles, on the other hand, allows everyone to sign on. Principles provide a pretext for sustained and structured
deliberation that gradually permits the elaboration ofmore detailed standards, for example via technical annexes or
regulations developed by intergovernmental or expert committees, without the need for repeated treaty ratifica-
tion. Despite the appearance of toothlessness, “[o]ver time . . . there is a progression . . . to rules, then to enforce-
ment of rules.”
Other scholars have arrived at similar findings.24 Koremenos, for instance, has identified human rights agree-
ments as generally more imprecise than other international legal instruments. Yet this appears to be for sound
reasons. “Large, heterogeneous groups of states with various cultures, ideologies, and institutional differences,”
she suggests, “can solve the underlying cooperation problems in human rights through imprecise language,
reservations, and optional protocols.”25
De Búrca likewise characterizes human rights regimes as based on open-ended principles, evolutive reasoning,
and a wide margin of discretion capable of accommodating states’ diverse approaches to implementation.26 It is
because of, not despite, such characteristics that human rights treaties can, at least sometimes, drive change and
hold governments to account. Their broad initial formulations permit bottom-up advocacy contextualized to
national circumstances. On this basis, supervisory bodies can encourage progressive regulatory measures tailored
to and legitimized by struggles on the periphery—rather than dictated by the center in advance.
20 JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 588-93 (2000).
21 John G. Ruggie, Get Real, or We’ll Get Nothing: Reflections on the First Session of the Intergovernmental Working Group on a Business & Human
Rights Treaty (2015).
22 BRAITHWAITE &DRAHOS, supra note 20, at 544. See, e.g., Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Sept. 22, 1988, 1513
UNTS 293; UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Jan. 20, 1994, 1771 UNTS 107.
23 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 20, at 619-20.
24 See, e.g., DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 183 (2010).
25 BARBARA KOREMENOS, THE CONTINENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXPLAINING AGREEMENT DESIGN 6 (2016).
26 Gráinne de Búrca, Global Experimentalist Governance and Human Rights, 6 ESIL REFLECTION (2018); Gráinne de Búrca, Human Rights
Experimentalism, 111 AJIL 277 (2016).
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Outline of a Business and Human Rights Treaty Styled as a Framework Agreement
Principles, then, should not be underestimated. Neither should it be thought that effectiveness attaches exclu-
sively to any particular international legal form.27
Besides, a UNGPs-based framework agreement would have the potential to capitalize on, rather than squander,
the widespread acceptance of the UN Framework and UNGPs amongst governments, labor, business and other
actors as well as substantial efforts since 2011 to implement them.28 Yet if hardening the UNGPs would constitute
a baseline, this approach would also offer scope to generate new soft and hard law standards on topics of global
concern as they emerge, such as systemic human rights challenges posed by big tech, AI, and the platform
economy.29
What would such an instrument look like? Basic elements could include the following.30 First, the instrument
should contain a statement of overall objectives, for example, “To strengthen the respect, promotion, protection
and fulfilment of human rights in the context of business activities; to prevent business-related human rights vio-
lations and abuses; and To ensure access to justice and effective remedy for victims of business-related human
rights violations and abuses.”
Second, it should include a statement of Guiding Principles. Initially these would need to track the text of the
UNGPs, lest the current impasse in negotiations be reproduced in another theater. However, they might conceiv-
ably be revised or supplemented later, if incorporated via an Annex or similar device.
Third, the text should address states’ general obligations. Here clauses might define states’duties to cooperate in
formulating protocols, procedures, and guidelines and to engage in collective actions where relevant with compe-
tent international and regional intergovernmental organizations. Building on the growing number of UNGPs
National Action Plans,31 general obligations should also require parties to develop, implement, periodically
update, and review comprehensive multisectoral national action plans or strategies on business and human rights.
States could also be required to establish or reinforce and finance a national coordinatingmechanism or focal point
on business and human rights; to adopt and implement effective legislative, executive, administrative or other mea-
sures; to cooperate to prevent and reduce business-related human rights abuses; and to enhance effective access to
a remedy.
Fourth, states should establish a mechanism for adopting subordinate instruments. Additional protocols might
address key parameters of national due diligence legislation, or legal accountability for business involvement in
abuses in conflict-affected areas. Formal guidelines might be an appropriate vehicle through which to address
national remedy regimes;32 human rights impact assessment per specific sectors or commodities; and corporate
human rights reporting. Standards generated by technical bodies or multi-stakeholder initiatives outside the treaty
27 Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AJIL 581.
28 Claire Methven O’Brien, Experimentalist Global Governance and the Case for a Framework Convention Based on the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, in NAVIGATING A NEW ERA OF BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES UNDER THE
UNGPS 204 (Matthew Mullen ed., 2019).
29 As demonstrated by e.g. developments under the UN Framework Convention Climate Change and Montreal Protocol.
30 Claire Methven O’Brien, Transnational Business and Human Rights: The Case for a Multi-Level Governance Approach (unpublished paper)
(2007); Submission to UN Open Ended Inter-Governmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations & Other Business
Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights (Sept., 2016); Jolyon Ford & Claire Methven O’Brien, Empty Rituals or Workable Models?
Towards a Business and Human Rights Treaty, 40 UNSW L. REV. 1223 (2017).
31 See, e.g., National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights.
32 These could build on guidance developed under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’s Accountability and
Remedy Project.
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framework,33 following appropriate scrutiny and review, could also be absorbed by this route, yielding for the
instrument’s overall system greater band-width and responsiveness than the single channel of treaty amendment
and reratification would permit.
Given its inherent flexibility, states ought not fear a treaty along such lines. In light of governments’ repeated
policy and public commitments to the UNGPs, responsible business, and sustainable development,34 opposing
such an instrument, if it is put on the table, could indeed be awkward. For this reason, if no other, such an approach
now deserves treaty advocates’ greater attention.
33 E.g., by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development under the aegis of Responsible Business Conduct.
34 GA Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Oct. 21, 2015).
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